Concept: Corporate governance
China’s Insurance Regulatory Reform, Corporate Governance Behavior and Insurers' Governance Effectiveness
- International journal of environmental research and public health
- Published over 3 years ago
External regulation is an important mechanism to improve corporate behavior in emerging markets. China’s insurance governance regulation, which began to supervise and guide insurance corporate governance behavior in 2006, has experienced a complex process of reform. This study tested our hypotheses with a sample of 85 firms during 2010-2011, which was obtained by providing a questionnaire to all of China’s shareholding insurance companies. The empirical study results generally show that China’s insurance governance effectiveness has significantly improved through strict regulation. Insurance corporate governance can improve business acumen and risk-control ability, but no significant evidence was found to prove its influence on profitability, as a result of focusing less attention on governance than on management. State ownership is associated with higher corporate governance effectiveness than non-state ownership. Listed companies tend to outperform non-listed firms, and life insurance corporate governance is more effective than that of property insurers. This study not only contributes to the comprehensive understanding of corporate governance effectiveness but also to the literature by highlighting the effect of corporate governance regulation in China’s insurance industry and other emerging economies of the financial sector.
The disconnect between real-world health care and the information delivered in boardrooms or policy discussions is a barrier to responsive governance and policymaking. So Mission Health immerses board members, journalists, legislators, and regulators in its daily work.
Previous research on the effects of leadership diversity on firm outcomes has produced inconsistent and inconclusive findings. While some scholars argue that diversity increases organizational equity and enhances performance, others argue that diversity increases conflict, reduces cooperation and harms performance. This study tests the impact of a variety of compositional factors on firm outcomes. Specifically, we analyze whether and how board composition affects the advancement and mobility of women CEOs and firm performance. Our analysis relies on a unique data set of all Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Board of Directors (BODs) in Fortune 500 companies over a ten-year period. We find a marginally significant positive relationship between board diversity and the likelihood of a woman being appointed CEO. We further find that board diversity significantly and positively influences the post-promotion success of women CEOs. Our findings suggest that board composition is critical for the appointment and success of women CEOs, and increasing board diversity should be central to any organizational diversity efforts.
Multi-stakeholder environmental management and governance processes are essential to realize social and ecological outcomes. Participation, collaboration, and learning are emphasized in these processes; to gain insights into how they influence stakeholders' evaluations of outcomes in relation to management and governance interventions we use a path analysis approach to examine their relationships in individuals in four UNESCO Biosphere Reserves. We confirm a model showing that participation in more activities leads to greater ratings of process, and in turn, better evaluations of outcomes. We show the effects of participation in activities on evaluation of outcomes appear to be driven by learning more than collaboration. Original insights are offered as to how the evaluations of outcomes by stakeholders are shaped by their participation in activities and their experiences in management and governance processes. Understanding stakeholder perceptions about the processes in which they are involved and their evaluation of outcomes is imperative, and influences current and future levels of engagement. As such, the evaluation of outcomes themselves are an important tangible product from initiatives. Our research contributes to a future research agenda aimed at better understanding these pathways and their implications for engagement in stewardship and ultimately social and ecological outcomes, and to developing recommendations for practitioners engaged in environmental management and governance.
The development of these guidelines is mandated by the American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists (AACE) Board of Directors and American College of Endocrinology (ACE) Board of Trustees and adheres with published AACE protocols for the standardized production of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs).
Conflicts of interest (COIs) have been defined by the American Thoracic Society as “a divergence between an individual’s private interests and his or her professional obligations such that an independent observer might reasonably question whether the individual’s professional actions or decisions are motivated by personal gain, such as direct financial, academic advancement, clinical revenue streams, or community standing.” In the context of guideline development, the concerns are not simply about identifying and disclosing direct financial or indirect COIs. Despite this recognition, the management of COIs in guidelines is often unsatisfactory. In response to requests from its international membership and informed by existing syntheses of the evidence and policies of international organizations, the Guidelines International Network Board of Trustees developed guidance on the disclosure of interests and management of COIs. Current approaches are relatively similar throughout the guideline development community, with an increasing recognition of the importance of disclosing and managing indirect COIs. Although there are differences in detail among the approaches, the similarities allow for the formulation of 9 core principles for managing COIs. In formulating these principles, the Guidelines International Network Board of Trustees recognizes that COIs cannot be totally avoided when panel members are being chosen for certain guidelines or in certain settings; thus, the important issue is the management of COIs in a fair, judicious, transparent manner.
The governance of patient safety is a challenging concern for all health systems. Yet, while the role of executive boards receives increased scrutiny, the area remains theoretically and methodologically underdeveloped. Specifically, we lack a detailed understanding of the performative aspects at play: what board members say and do to discharge their accountabilities for patient safety. This article draws on qualitative data from overt non-participant observation of four NHS hospital Foundation Trust boards in England. Applying a dramaturgical framework to explore scripting, setting, staging and performance, we found important differences between case study sites in the performative dimensions of processing and interpretation of infection control data. We detail the practices associated with these differences - the legitimation of current performance, the querying of data classification, and the naming and shaming of executives - to consider their implications.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has never fulfilled its original mission of simultaneously serving as the world’s pre-eminent public health authority and intergovernmental platform for global health negotiations. While WHO’s secretariat works hard to fulfill both functions, it is undermined by an institutional design that mixes technical and political mandates. This forces staff to walk uncomfortably along many fine lines: advising but never directing; guiding but never governing; leading but never advocating; evaluating but never judging. The result is mediocrity on both fronts. Instead, WHO should be split in two, separating its technical and political stewardship functions into separate entities, with collaboration in areas of overlap. The Executive Board and secretariat would be bifurcated, with technical units reporting to a Technical Board and political units reporting to a Political Board. Both boards would report to the World Health Assembly where all member states would continue to provide ultimate oversight. Such bold changes can be implemented either by revising WHO’s constitution or through simpler mechanisms. Either way, structural governance reforms would need to be accompanied by complementary changes in culture that support strengthened political decision-making and scientific independence. States' inability to act on WHO’s institutional design challenges will only lead them and non-state actors to continue bypassing the organization through the creation of new entities as they have done over the last 15 years. The key will be to mobilize those advocates and decision-makers who have the audacity to demand more from WHO and convince member states to elevate their ambitions in current WHO reform efforts. Continued progress in global health depends on it.
The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), a UN initiative to engage corporations in supporting the UN’s mission, sets out principles that companies should follow for more ethical business practices. Since its inception in 2000, at least 13 tobacco companies, subsidiaries and tobacco industry affiliates joined the UNGC. In a September 2017 integrity review, the UNGC Board excluded from UNGC participation companies who derive revenue from tobacco production or manufacturing.
The methods and processes described in this manuscript have been approved and adopted by the NOF Board of Trustees on November 11, 2015. This manuscript has been peer-reviewed by the NOF Research Committee and Osteoporosis International. The National Osteoporosis Foundation frequently publishes position statements for the benefit of educating healthcare professionals and the general public on a particular issue and/or concern related to preventing osteoporosis and/or promoting strong bones throughout the lifespan. This manuscript represents the official methods and processes adopted by the NOF Board of Trustees for the purpose developing future position statements in a transparent and unbiased manner.