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In patients with difficult airways, there can be difficulty with advancing the endotracheal tube into the airway even with a good view of the glottis using video laryngoscopy. The purpose of this study was to determine if the time required to intubate an airway and the number of gaze changes by the laryngoscopist could be decreased by using a novel video laryngoscope technique. Sixteen experienced Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists were recruited to intubate a manikin with a normal or difficult airway using both the laryngoscope first technique and a new endotracheal tube first technique (4 intubations total) in a randomized sequence. The data were analyzed with the Mann-Whitney (U) test to compare the differences between the normal and difficult airway conditions. Although no significant difference was noted in the time to intubation between intubation techniques, the number of gaze changes was found to be significantly fewer in the tube first technique (P=.0009). A steep learning curve, associated with the accommodation of the manikin, was demonstrated by a decrease in time and gaze changes with subsequent intubations. Incorporating the endotracheal tube first technique into an education curriculum could increase patient safety by decreasing the time to secure a difficult airway.

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Patients with neuromuscular diseases such as myasthenia gravis can present as complicated anesthetic cases. This article reviews anesthetic considerations for optimal perioperative care of patients with myasthenia gravis. The pathophysiology of myasthenia gravis, cholinergic and myasthenic crises, and perioperative management are discussed; this includes the pharmacology of acetylcholinesterase inhibitors vs sugammadex, extubation criteria, pain management, and risk factors for postoperative myasthenic crisis. Anesthesia recommendations include reversal of nondepolarizing neuromuscular blockade agents with sugammadex, obtaining sufficient spontaneous breathing with absolutely no residual curarization before extubation, limited use of opioids and sedatives, avoidance of routine admission to the intensive care unit, and consideration of peripheral nerve blocks for adjunct pain control.

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Newton published his deduction of universal gravity in Principia (first ed., 1687). To establish the universality (the particle-to-particle nature) of gravity, Newton must establish the additivity of mass. I call ‘additivity’ the property a body’s quantity of matter has just in case, if gravitational force is proportional to that quantity, the force can be taken to be the sum of forces proportional to each particle’s quantity of matter. Newton’s argument for additivity is obscure. I analyze and assess manuscript versions of Newton’s initial argument within his initial deduction, dating from early 1685. Newton’s strategy depends on distinguishing two quantities of matter, which I call ‘active’ and ‘passive’, by how they are measured. These measurement procedures frame conditions on the additivity of each quantity so measured. While Newton has direct evidence for the additivity of passive quantity of matter, he does not for that of the active quantity. Instead, he tries to infer the latter from the former via conceptual analyses of the third law of motion grounded largely on analogies to magnetic attractions. The conditions needed to establish passive additivity frustrate Newton’s attempted inference to active additivity.

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From the 1940s, reproductive physiology and livestock genetics transformed dairy cattle breeding and became, in conjunction with the new reproductive technology of artificial insemination, important drivers of agricultural modernization in most countries with significant dairying. While this is well known, we know less about the longer-term interplay between specifically veterinary interests in reproduction and the institutional development of cattle breeding. In the present paper, I therefore examine the veterinary disciplining of cattle reproduction-its constitution as a veterinary scientific discipline and the extension of veterinary control over it-in mid-twentieth century Sweden. I show how veterinary scientists derived legitimacy for their fledgling discipline by engaging with the problems of practical breeding, and that in doing so they also exercised influence over breeding’s development. By making bulls' reproductive disturbances visible and framing them as hereditary, they undermined the conservative interests of commercial breeders. The development of veterinary reproductive science thereby played an important role in reshaping the culture, economy, and regulations of cattle breeding in Sweden as it shifted from a prewar regime dominated by elite breeders to a postwar regime that, ostensibly, served all dairy farmers in the country.

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In this paper, I argue for a distinction between two scales of coordination in scientific inquiry, through which I reassess Georg Simon Ohm’s work on conductivity and resistance. Firstly, I propose to distinguish between measurement coordination, which refers to the specific problem of how to justify the attribution of values to a quantity by using a certain measurement procedure, and general coordination, which refers to the broader issue of justifying the representation of an empirical regularity by means of abstract mathematical tools. Secondly, I argue that the development of Ohm’s measurement practice between the first and the second experimental phase of his work involved the change of the measurement coordination on which he relied to express his empirical results. By showing how Ohm relied on different calibration assumptions and practices across the two phases, I demonstrate that the concurrent change of both Ohm’s experimental apparatus and the variable that Ohm measured should be viewed based on the different form of measurement coordination. Finally, I argue that Ohm’s assumption that tension is equally distributed in the circuit is best understood as part of the general coordination between Ohm’s law and the empirical regularity that it expresses, rather than measurement coordination.

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What sort of justification can be claimed for abduction? In this paper we reconstruct Peirce’s answer to this question. We show that in his early works on the logic of science Peirce provided an abductive justification of abduction, and that in his mature writings the early solution is enriched by a reference to the place abduction has in a typical scientific inquiry. Since abduction is the first stage of inquiry by which a hypothesis is suggested and which then has to be subjected to inductive testing, the fundamental abduction (ur-abduction) that justifies abduction has also to be subjected to a verification by means of a fundamental induction (ur-induction), namely that the abduction that abduction is valid is verified by an appeal to the history of science.

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Intellectual legacies are part of historians' concerns, when they study the evolution of ideas. There are, however, no guidelines to help characterize the reception of intellectual legacies. This article provides preliminary tools to fill this gap, with a typology (faithful, formal, substantial legacies), and with two criteria to assess the conformity between the heir’s and her inspirer’s proposals. The objective is not to judge the legitimacy of this or that reception, but to facilitate its characterization, for a better understanding of the transmission of ideas. One case study from the history of economic thought, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s bioeconomics and its legacies, is provided to illustrate the operability of the toolbox.

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We start by reviewing the complicated situation in methods of scientific attribution of climate change to extreme weather events. We emphasize the social values involved in using both so-called ″storyline″ and ordinary probabilistic or ″risk-based″ methods, noting that one important virtue claimed by the storyline approach is that it features a reduction in false negative results, which has much social and ethical merit, according to its advocates. This merit is critiqued by the probabilistic, risk-based, opponents, who claim the high ground; the usual probabilistic approach is claimed to be more objective and more ″scientific″, under the grounds that it reduces false positive error. We examine this mostly-implicit debate about error, which apparently mirrors the old Jeffrey-Rudner debate. We also argue that there is an overlooked component to the role of values in science: that of second-order inductive risk, and that it makes the relative role of values in the two methods different from what it first appears to be. In fact, neither method helps us to escape social values, and be more scientifically ″objective″ in the sense of being removed or detached from human values and interests. The probabilistic approach does not succeed in doing so, contrary to the claims of its proponents. This is important to understand, because neither method is, fundamentally, a successful strategy for climate scientists to avoid making value judgments.

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In this paper, we present an explanatory objection to Norton’s material theory of induction, as applied to predictive inferences. According to the objection we present, there is an explanatory disconnect between our beliefs about the future and the relevant future facts. We argue that if we recognize such a disconnect, we are no longer rationally entitled to our future beliefs.

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As an application of his Material Theory of Induction, Norton (2018; manuscript) argues that the correct inductive logic for a fair infinite lottery, and also for evaluating eternal inflation multiverse models, is radically different from standard probability theory. This is due to a requirement of label independence. It follows, Norton argues, that finite additivity fails, and any two sets of outcomes with the same cardinality and co-cardinality have the same chance. This makes the logic useless for evaluating multiverse models based on self-locating chances, so Norton claims that we should despair of such attempts. However, his negative results depend on a certain reification of chance, consisting in the treatment of inductive support as the value of a function, a value not itself affected by relabeling. Here we define a purely comparative infinite lottery logic, where there are no primitive chances but only a relation of ‘at most as likely’ and its derivatives. This logic satisfies both label independence and a comparative version of additivity as well as several other desirable properties, and it draws finer distinctions between events than Norton’s. Consequently, it yields better advice about choosing between sets of lottery tickets than Norton’s, but it does not appear to be any more helpful for evaluating multiverse models. Hence, the limitations of Norton’s logic are not entirely due to the failure of additivity, nor to the fact that all infinite, co-infinite sets of outcomes have the same chance, but to a more fundamental problem: We have no well-motivated way of comparing disjoint countably infinite sets.